Conditional Rights and Comparative Wrongs:  More on the Theory and Application of Comparative Criminal Liability by Bergelson, Vera
Rutgers Law School (Newark)
Faculty Papers
Year  Paper 
Conditional Rights and Comparative Wrongs:
More on the Theory and Application of
Comparative Criminal Liability
Vera Bergelson∗
∗Rutgers (Newark) School of Law, vbergelson@kinoy.rutgers.edu
This working paper is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be commer-
cially reproduced without the permission of the copyright holder.
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art32
Copyright c©2005 by the author.
Conditional Rights and Comparative Wrongs:
More on the Theory and Application of
Comparative Criminal Liability
Vera Bergelson
Abstract
This article continues to develop an argument in favor of comparative criminal lia-
bility started in “Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for Comparative Liabil-
ity in Criminal Law,” (http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/fp/art19/) Buff.
Crim. L. Rev. 385 (2005). The essence of my argument is that people’s rights
are not static but depend on their actions, and victims may reduce their right not
to be harmed either voluntarily, by consent, waiver or assumption of risk, or in-
voluntarily, by an attack on some legally recognized rights of the perpetrator. If
that happens, perpetrators should be entitled to a defense of complete or partial
justification, which would eliminate or diminish their criminal liability.
In this second piece, I respond to the commentaries by Dean Hurd and Profes-
sors Harel, Husak and Simons. At the same time I further develop the theory of
comparative criminal liability by focusing mainly on three groups of issues:
conceptual questions involving the underlying theory of rights; application of the
principle of conditionality of rights to particular areas of criminal law (e.g., as-
sumption of risk, contributory negligence, attempts and endangerment, and mul-
tiple perpetrators); and practical implementation of the defense of comparative
criminal liability.
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Conditional Rights and Comparative 
Wrongs: More on the Theory and 
Application of Comparative Criminal 
Liability 
Vera Bergelson† 
Dean Hurd and Professors Harel, Husak, and Simons 
have raised a number of interesting questions in connection 
with my argument for comparative criminal liability 
pursuant to which the victim’s conduct should be taken into 
account for proper determination of the perpetrator’s 
liability.1  In “Victims and Perpetrators,” I suggested that 
our rights are not static but depend on our actions.  Based 
on that principle, which I called the principle of 
conditionality of rights, victims may reduce their right not 
to be harmed either voluntarily, by consent, waiver, or 
assumption of risk, or involuntarily, by an attack on some 
legally recognized rights of the perpetrator.  If that 
happens, perpetrators should be entitled to a defense of 
complete or partial justification, which would eliminate or 
diminish their criminal liability. 
This article is an attempt to further develop the 
proposed theory of comparative criminal liability while 
addressing the most important issues brought up by the 
commentators.  These issues can be divided into three 
 
 †  Associate Professor, Rutgers School of Law-Newark; J.D., University of 
Pennsylvania; Ph.D., Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies at the Academy of 
Sciences of the Soviet Union.  I want to thank Dean Heidi M. Hurd and Professors 
Alon Harel, Douglas Husak, and Kenneth W. Simons for their insightful and 
stimulating comments and Professor Markus Dirk Dubber for the opportunity to 
discuss some of the most fascinating problems of criminal law with some of the 
most fascinating legal scholars.  I am also grateful to Professors Norman L. 
Cantor, Sherry F. Colb, Gary L. Francione, Howard Latin, John Leubsdorf, and 
George Thomas for their thoughts and suggestions regarding this article; to my 
research assistants Elina Leviyeva and Melanie L. Ryan for their help in 
preparing this article for publication; and to the Dean’s Research Fund of Rutgers 
School of Law-Newark for its financial support. 
 1. See Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for 
Comparative Liability in Criminal Law, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 385 (2005) 
[hereinafter Victims and Perpetrators]. 
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groups: conceptual questions involving the underlying 
theory of rights, application of the principle of 
conditionality of rights to particular areas of criminal law, 
and practical implementation of the advocated defense of 
comparative criminal liability.2  Before I turn to these 
issues, however, I would like to address some general 
misunderstandings and make clear what I do not argue. 
FIRST, contrary to what Simons3 and Hurd4 seem to 
think, I do not argue that, in order to reduce the 
perpetrator’s liability, the victim has to be at fault.  True, a 
faulty victim (e.g., a vicious aggressor) is the most 
persuasive example of why we should view the criminal act 
as an interaction.  However, my thesis is broader.  I 
maintain that the victim’s conduct, faulty or not, may affect 
the criminal liability of the perpetrator, if that conduct 
changes the balance of rights and duties between the 
perpetrator and the victim. 
One does not have to be at fault to change the legal 
relationship between oneself and another person.  Consent 
is an example of a voluntary no-fault change of status: 
using Hurd’s words, it “turns a rape into love-making, a 
kidnapping into a Sunday drive, a battery into a football 
tackle, a theft into a gift, and a trespass into a dinner 
party.”5  As for an involuntary no-fault example, we can 
think of a person whose nonculpable actions have put 
another in a position of peril—e.g., a driver who, through 
no fault of his own, hits a pedestrian.  Despite his lack of 
 
 2. The first group of issues is discussed in paras. 1-3; the second group of 
issues is discussed in paras. 4-8; and the third group of issues is discussed in 
para. 9 of this article. 
 3. Kenneth W. Simons, The Relevance of Victim Conduct in Tort and 
Criminal Law, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 541, 543-44; 545 (2005) (first arriving at an 
erroneous conclusion that I consider victim’s fault necessary to reduce the 
perpetrator’s culpability and then citing examples from my article that contradict 
this conclusion). 
 4. Heidi M. Hurd, Blaming the Victim: A Response to the Proposal that 
Criminal Law Recognize a General Defense of Contributory Responsibility, 8 
Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 503, 507, 507 n.5 (2005) (redefining my argument regarding 
victim’s contributory responsibility in categories of faulty behavior). 
 5. Id. at 504. 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art32
BERGELSONREPLYMACRO.DOC 4/20/2005  11:43 AM 
2005] REPLY 569 
fault, the driver cannot simply drive off; he has suddenly 
acquired a duty of care with respect to that pedestrian. 
In other words, culpability is irrelevant to the 
existence or magnitude of the wrongdoing (although it is 
certainly relevant to the determination of responsibility).6  
Moreover, if the victim is at fault, the comparative analysis 
of the perpetrator’s and the victim’s culpability is 
appropriate, among other tests, to determine their 
comparative responsibility for the harm and, accordingly, 
the extent to which the perpetrator’s liability should be 
reduced.  I discuss that in more detail in section III.C.4 of 
my article.7 
SECOND, I do not argue that the victim’s conduct is the 
only ground that may provide full or partial justification for 
an infringement on the victim’s rights.8  That would 
certainly be incorrect.  The victim’s rights may be overridden 
although the victim did nothing to lose or reduce them.  The 
obvious example is the balance of evils, which provides 
justification to the perpetrator who infringed on the rights of 
the victim in order to preserve either some more important 
rights of other people or equally important rights of a larger 
group of people.  The principle of conditionality of rights, 
according to which the victim’s conduct may affect the 
perpetrator’s liability, is just one principle among other ones 
capable of affecting people’s rights. 
 
 6. See Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law 
334 (1997). 
Causing harm to another without justification is sufficient for wrongdoing, 
but it is not sufficient for responsibility.  Responsibility requires, in 
addition, that the wrongdoer be culpable.  That X violated Y’s rights with 
his action, and that X thereby did wrong, is one question; whether X is 
responsible because he did so culpably, is another and separate question 
which has nothing to do with causing Y harm. 
Id. at 334-35. 
 7. See Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 475. 
 8. See Alon Harel, Victims and Perpetrators: The Case against a Unified 
Theory of Comparative Liability in Criminal Law, 8 Buffalo Crim. L. Rev. 489, 
493 (2005) (observing that the principle of conditionality of rights applies only to 
cases in which the victim’s actions, and not the state of affairs brought about by 
the victim’s or someone else’s actions, affect the perpetrator’s duties toward the 
victim). 
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THIRD, I do not argue that the principle of 
conditionality of rights “is a natural extension of the 
traditional ‘heat of passion’ doctrine, which partly justifies 
an actor who responds violently to certain types of 
unjustified provocation.”9  I wonder whether Simons might 
have confused two independent arguments—one, analytical, 
based on the theory of rights,10 and the other, more specific, 
calling for consistency of legal rules.11  The defense of 
provocation, or “heat of passion,” due to its dual nature 
(combination of justification and excuse) and merely 
mitigating character, only partially embodies the principle of 
conditionality of rights.  Unlike that defense, the principle of 
conditionality of rights is entirely justificatory in nature; it 
provides support for both full and partial defenses; and it 
does not require provocative actions on the part of the victim 
or violent actions on the part of the perpetrator.12 
FOURTH, I do not argue that the defense of 
comparative criminal liability can be only partial.  I am not 
sure what led Husak to this conclusion,13 but I most 
certainly intended the opposite when I repeatedly said 
throughout the article that “[i]n some circumstances, the 
victim’s conduct would provide a complete justification, 
whereas in other circumstances it would only mitigate the 
defendant’s liability.”14 
 
 9. Simons, supra note 3, at 553. 
 10. See Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 462-65. 
 11. See Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 432-35. 
 12. For example, a tenant is completely justified if he paints the entire house 
black upon obtaining his landlord’s consent to use any color he wishes.  Even if 
that act reduces the market value of the house and even if the landlord regrets 
his unwise decision the very moment he sees the result (i.e. the landlord is 
objectively and subjectively harmed), the tenant is completely justified in what he 
did because the landlord has transferred to him the power to choose the color for 
the house. 
 13. Douglas Husak, Comparative Fault in Criminal Law: Conceptual and 
Normative Perplexities, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 523, 531 (2005). 
Of course, Bergelson does not want victim fault to function as a complete 
defense, but rather as a fault mitigator.  Her thesis that victim fault should 
provide a partial rather than a complete defense led to her previous 
assertion that victim fault results in a reduction rather than in a total 
forfeiture of rights. 
 14. Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 487. 
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Both consent and self-defense can serve as complete 
exculpation or partial mitigation, depending on the facts.  
For example, self-defense is a complete justification for 
homicide if the defendant applied reasonably necessary 
force in order to protect his own life against the victim’s 
attack.  However, if the defendant exceeded what was 
reasonably necessary under the circumstances, he should 
be entitled only to mitigation of his criminal liability.  As I 
explain in my article, in that case, he should be responsible 
for the “extra” force because the attacker has lost his right 
not to be attacked at all, but retained a right not to be 
attacked with a disproportionate amount of force.15 
In fact, out of the recognized applications of the 
principle of conditionality of rights, only the defense of 
provocation is partial by design.  Consent, assumption of 
risk, and self-defense can be “perfect” or “imperfect,” but 
provocation is always “imperfect” in the sense that it 
applies only to situations in which the defendant has 
overstepped the boundaries of behavior warranted by the 
actions of the victim.  I doubt that Husak would object to 
the partial nature of the defense of provocation. 
*** 
With these clarifications, I turn to some of the issues 
raised by the commentators.  I am pleased that all four of 
them seem to agree with my general thesis that there are 
circumstances when the victim’s conduct must be taken 
into consideration in order to determine fairly the 
magnitude of the perpetrator’s criminal liability.  I can only 
second Husak in that “anyone who contends that victim 
fault is and ought to be irrelevant in all cases simply does 
not know what he is talking about.”16  In the rest of this 
article, I discuss certain specific implications of this thesis. 
 
 15. Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 466. 
 16. Husak, supra note 13, at 523. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
BERGELSONREPLYMACRO.DOC 4/20/2005  11:43 AM 
572 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:567 
I.  WHAT DO CONSENT, SELF-DEFENSE, AND PROVOCATION 
HAVE IN COMMON? 
My general claim is that by his acts a person (A) can 
change the balance of rights between himself and another 
(B), and thereby either eliminate B’s criminal liability or at 
least reduce the seriousness of B’s wrongdoing.  I am 
grateful to Harel for bringing up Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld’s typology and showing where the principle of 
conditionality of rights fits into it.17  That my argument 
indirectly draws on Hohfeld’s vision of rights is beyond 
doubt: it is impossible today to talk about rights without 
taking into account Hohfeld’s classic work.18  Moreover, in 
building my proposal, I employ theories of rights, among 
others, of Judith Jarvis Thomson and Joel Feinberg who in 
turn have absorbed and expanded Hohfeld’s ideas. 
Considering this well-established intellectual tradition, 
to which all four of my commentators have made valuable 
contributions, I am somewhat puzzled that Harel19 and 
Simons20 refuse to see the conceptual link between the 
doctrines of consent, self-defense, and, to some degree (since 
it is only in part a defense of justification), provocation.  
While these doctrines apply to different circumstances, they 
have a similar effect on one’s rights and, through that, on 
the attribution of harm and imposition of liability. 
 
 17. Harel writes: 
As such this principle identifies circumstances in which a person can 
unilaterally create, extinguish, or transform obligations imposed on 
another person.  A right to change the normative status of others is a right 
labeled by Hohfeld a power (or ability).  Under Hohfeld’s characterization, 
stating that a person A has a power (or ability) to X implies that A is 
capable of changing the legal (or moral) rights of others. 
Harel, supra note 8, at 491. 
 18. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, and Other Legal Essays (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923). 
 19. Harel, supra note 8, at 496 (“I can see nothing useful in lumping the power 
a person has to extinguish duties owed to her by consent together with the power 
she has to extinguish duties owed to her by attacking other people.”). 
 20. Simons, supra note 3, at 544 (claiming that it is “both unhelpful and 
misleading” to suggest that a single principle “explains and justifies these three 
exceptions as well as Bergelson’s proposed expansion of the three categories”). 
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To have a right means to have a certain moral and/or 
legal status that defines the scope of freedoms and 
obligations between the right holder and others.  People 
can terminate or suspend their rights and thereby change 
these freedoms and obligations.  In one of her essays, 
Thomson reviews various ways in which people may cease 
to have rights.21  Among those are consent, waiver, and 
forfeiture.  Each of them functions to transfer privileges, 
claims, and powers from the right holder to others. 
Consent, for example, may exist in the form of giving 
permission, which extends privileges and claims to the 
consent receiver.  If A tells B, “Feel free to eat this salad,” 
A both gives B the privilege of eating the salad and 
promises not to interfere with B’s exercising this 
privilege.22  Consent may also extend powers.  If A tells B, 
“Do whatever you want with this salad,” A gives B the 
power to become the salad owner, to make someone else the 
salad owner, or to abandon the salad altogether.23  Even 
without going into details, it is clear that by giving consent 
a person at the very least waives the right that certain 
things not be done to him or his property. 
Forfeiture of a right has the same effect: a person gives 
up the right that certain things not be done to him.  
Forfeiture may happen without fault, e.g., by choosing not 
to exercise a right.  More often, however, examples of 
forfeiture involve fault.  Take one used by Thomson: B 
villainously acts in a way that, if no one interferes, will 
constitute a violation of a claim of A’s.24  Thomson 
concludes that if A can defend himself against B’s violation 
of his claim only by causing B harm, then A has a privilege 
of doing so because, by his own acts, B has divested himself 
of a claim against A.25 
 
 21. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Ceasing to Have a Right, in The Realm of Rights 
348 (1990). 
 22. Id. at 348, 352. 
 23. Id. at 352-53. 
 24. Id. at 361. 
 25. Id. at 361-62. 
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In other words, A’s consent to B’s doing certain things 
and A’s violation of B’s rights allowing B to act in self-
defense have one and the same effect: A ceases to have a 
right; therefore, B violates no right of A.  Is there a good 
reason for “lumping . . . together”26 specific defenses that (i) 
originate from the same theory of rights; (ii) are, using 
Harel’s words, examples of victim-specific powers; and (iii) 
have the same effect on the rights and duties of the 
participants of an interaction?  I would think so. 
II.  RIGHTS: LIMITED OR REDUCED? 
A significant portion of Husak’s comment is devoted to 
the discussion of what he calls “conceptual perplexities” in 
connection with the principle of conditionality of rights.  
Husak raises a valid question about the general theory of 
rights that would support that principle.  Suggesting an 
inconsistency in my approach, Husak presents the principle 
of conditionality of rights as a case of specification (which, 
as I hope to show in a moment, it is not), and then 
successfully attacks his own erroneous supposition. 
I am grateful to Husak for this misunderstanding—it 
gives me an opportunity to better define my views and 
explore certain nuances of which I did not think before.  
Thus, I would like to reply not to Husak’s interpretation of 
my proposal but instead to his original question: how does 
the principle of conditionality of rights fit into a broader 
theory of rights?  For the lack of space, this reply is 
inevitably just a road map. 
Husak is correct that I do not view people’s rights, 
even the most fundamental ones (like the right to life or 
bodily security), as absolute.27  If they were absolute, we 
would be morally and legally paralyzed every time two 
identical absolute rights (for example, rights to life of two 
different persons) clashed.28  The principle of conditionality 
 
 26. Harel, supra note 8, at 496. 
 27. Husak, supra note 13, at 526-27. 
 28. For an excellent discussion of why rights are not absolute, see, e.g., Joel 
Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 Phil. & Pub. 
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of rights explicitly recognizes the non-absolute character of 
rights by providing that one may lose or reduce them due to 
his own right-altering conduct, e.g., by consent or an attack 
on rights of others. 
Since I do not view rights as absolute, I naturally do not 
subscribe to the theory of specification.  Under the 
specification theory, individuals do not “cease” to have 
rights—their rights are limited from the outset and, in this 
limited form, are absolute.  For example, a person does not 
have a right not to be killed.  He only has the right—yet the 
absolute right—not to be killed wrongly or unjustly 
(pursuant to the moral version of specification) or except in 
certain circumstances (pursuant to factual specification).  
My argument presumes that people’s rights are not absolute 
and that they may be lost or reduced, which means that the 
theory of rights I employ is anything but specification.29 
There are a couple of reasons why I reject the 
specification theory.  One is that, following Feinberg, I am 
pessimistic about the plausibility of fully defining a right—
it would take volumes and it has never been actually 
done.30  Yet more importantly, specification is based on an 
“incorrect view of rights,”31 pursuant to which, if there are 
 
Aff., 93, 97-99 (1978) (pointing out that a conflict between two absolute rights is 
“logically impossible in just the manner of a hypothetical conflict between an 
irresistible force and an immoveable object”).  Feinberg has defined absolute 
rights in the following way: 
An absolute right (if there is such a thing) is a right that would remain in 
one’s possession, fully effective as a ground for other people’s duties to one, 
in all possible circumstances.  If my right to X is absolute, then there are no 
circumstances in which it is “subject to legitimate limitation” or in which 
the correlated duties of others to me in respect to X are suspended.  If the 
right is absolute, then I possess it, and others are bound to me in the 
appropriate ways in all circumstances without exception. 
Id. at 97-98.  See also Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense and Rights, in Rights, 
Restitution, and Risk 33, 40-42 (William Parent ed., 1986); Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, Some Ruminations on Rights, id. at 49; and Judith Jarvis Thomson, 
Rights and Compensation, id. at 66. 
 29. For a similar point, see Thomson, Self-Defense and Rights, supra note 28, 
at 40 (observing that “neither [factual nor moral specification] would be opted for 
by anyone who did not take the view that rights are, in a certain sense, absolute”). 
 30. See Feinberg, supra note 28, at 99-100. 
 31. Thomson, Self-Defense and Rights, supra note 28, at 39-40. 
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circumstances when someone’s right has a priority over 
mine, it means that I never had the relevant right in the 
first place. 
Take a well-known example with mountaineers who 
saved their lives by breaking into someone’s cabin and 
staying there for a few days while waiting out a snow 
storm.  Of course, under any theory of rights, the actions of 
the mountaineers were justified as the “lesser evil”: by 
invading the cabin owner’s property rights in his cabin and 
food, they avoided a greater harm of death or serious 
injuries to the members of the group.  The specification 
theory, however, would justify the mountaineers not 
because their right to life was more important than the 
cabin owner’s property rights, but because the cabin 
owner’s property rights were limited from the outset and 
simply did not exist under the described circumstances.  
Thus the mountaineers did not infringe on any rights at all. 
But is that correct?  I think not.  Because if that were 
the case, the cabin owner would not be entitled to any 
compensation for the consumed food or other loss caused by 
the mountaineers.  And, as we know, the law does provide 
for compensation to a party whose rights were invaded in a 
case of private necessity.  Therefore, it is inaccurate to say 
that the cabin owner’s property rights were limited from 
the outset.  One could say, as I sometimes do in “Victims 
and Perpetrators,” that they are conditionally limited, but 
all that really means is that they are not limited until and 
unless a certain condition is satisfied. 
Husak’s erroneous assumption that the principle of 
conditionality of rights is based on the specification theory 
leads him to say that this principle “is not compatible with 
a theory that alleges that victims forfeit their rights by 
engaging in faulty behavior.”32  In my view, this conclusion 
is incorrect: by acting in a certain way, a person may 
trigger a condition on which a certain right of his depends.  
As Thomson puts it, an aggressor “(conditionally) divests 
himself of claims he had formerly had: here there is not 
 
 32. Husak, supra note 13, at 528. 
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permissible infringement of claims, but the forfeiting of 
them.”33  In fact, out of the three theories discussed by 
Thomson,34 the principle of conditionality of rights is 
probably closest to the “forfeit” theory—with two caveats. 
One, “forfeit” is a loaded term.  For my purposes, it is 
more accurate to talk about the loss or reduction of rights, 
not their complete forfeiture.  A right that has been lost 
may be regained; “forfeit” suggests that the right has been 
lost forever.35 
The other caveat is perhaps more important.  It seems 
to me that we should use different theories when explaining 
situations involving a victim who chose to change his moral 
status vis-à-vis the perpetrator and situations in which the 
victim lacked either actus reus or the requisite mens rea.  In 
the second instance (which would include cases of “innocent 
aggressors,”36 “innocent threats”37 and “innocent shields”38), 
 
 33. Thomson, supra note 21, at 362. 
 34. The three theories are “forfeit,” “specification,” and “overriding.”  See 
Thomson, Self-Defense and Rights, supra note 28, at 33-48. 
 35. Thomson acknowledges this difference: “[S]aying that Aggressor simply 
ceased to have the right is not the same as saying that Aggressor has forfeited the 
right.”  Id. at 37. 
 36. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-
Protection, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1475 (1999).  Alexander defines “innocent 
aggressors” as 
[t]hose who appear to be attacking me without legal justification, but who 
are legally and morally nonculpable in doing so.  They may be acting on a 
reasonable but mistaken belief that I am threatening them or others.  They 
may be insane.  Or they may be small children who have picked up loaded 
pistols. 
 Id. at 1481-82. 
 37. See, e.g. Claire Oakes Finkelstein, On the Obligation of the State to 
Extend a Right of Self-Defense to Its Citizens, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1361 (1999).  
Finkelstein writes: 
The innocent threat is a man who has been pushed off the edge of a cliff 
and is barreling toward you as you sit on a terrace below.  The problem is 
that he is fat, very fat, and if he lands on you he will kill you.  The only 
thing you have time to do is shift the position of an awning over your head.  
If you do shift the awning, he will be catapulted into a ravine and die, and 
you will survive.  If you do not shift the awning, you will die and he will 
survive, because you will break his fall. 
Id. at 1369. 
 38. See, e.g., Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 35 (1974).  Nozick 
defines innocent shields as 
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the “overriding” and not the loss/reduction of rights rationale 
may be more appropriate. 
Compare, for example, cases of self-defense against a 
villainous aggressor and against an “innocent threat.”  In 
both instances the perpetrator is justified in causing harm 
to the victim (to the extent that is necessary to protect the 
perpetrator against the harm the victim would otherwise 
cause him).  But in the first case the victim did something 
to deserve that, whereas in the second case the unfortunate 
victim just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong 
time.  The rationale behind the “innocent threat” cases 
seems to be the same as behind the “necessity” cases.  
Unlike the villainous aggressor, an “innocent threat” victim 
does not lose or reduce his right to life; this right is 
overridden by considerations of “greater good.” 
Husak asks how a person may “reduce” his right not to 
be harmed.  As I explain in my article, by this general right 
not to be harmed I mean a cluster of distinguishable rights: 
for example, not to be attacked, not to be attacked with 
deadly weapons, not to be physically hurt, seriously 
injured, maimed, tortured, raped, or killed.39  If I attack you 
using a stuffed animal as a weapon, I may lose my right not 
to be attacked but most likely I will not lose my right not to 
be killed.  What happened then to my general right not to 
be harmed?  I retained some of the rights that form it but 
not all.  It became more limited, “reduced.” 
I argue that a person very seldom, if ever, loses all of 
the specific rights forming this general right not to be 
harmed.  Partly this is so because we view certain rights as 
inalienable.  The right not to be severely tortured (at least 
tortured to death) is probably one of them.  In current law 
and moral philosophy, a person may neither waive nor 
 
those innocent persons who themselves are nonthreats but who are so 
situated that they will be damaged by the only means available for 
stopping the threat.  Innocent persons strapped onto the front of the tanks 
of aggressors so that the tanks cannot be hit without also hitting them are 
innocent shields . . . . 
Id. 
 39. See Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 465-66. 
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forfeit that right.  Another reason why a person may not 
lose all his rights is the teleological nature of the 
permission to cause non-consensual harm.  For example, 
B’s privilege to harm A is limited to the amount of harm 
necessary for the protection of B’s rights that are about to 
be violated by A. 
In this regard, it is interesting to turn to Husak’s 
argument about rape.  He sees “no reason to exempt rape 
from the class of offenses for which victim fault can 
mitigate the liability of perpetrators.”40  According to 
Husak, one situation in which the perpetrator’s liability 
might be mitigated is post-penetration rape.41  I disagree 
with that for a number of reasons. 
In my view, sex without consent is sex without 
consent, no matter when the consent was refused.  
Moreover, if the reason for withdrawing consent is, say, 
physical pain or emotional discomfort caused by the 
intercourse, there is a good chance the victim was not 
aware that she would experience this pain or discomfort 
when she gave her consent.  I fail to see why the 
perpetrator who ignored the victim’s pleas to stop is less 
guilty simply because at some point in the past the victim 
did not object. 
To be sure, Husak is right that rape, like any other 
crime, can be graded.42  For example, under the Wisconsin 
Penal Code, a person who has a sexual intercourse with 
another without consent is guilty of third degree sexual 
assault.  If, in addition, the perpetrator uses or threatens to 
 
 40. Husak, supra note 13, at 533. 
 41. Id. at 533.  Husak suggests that the best way to accomplish this mitigation 
is by “enacting a new crime of post-penetration rape, less serious than a crime in 
which consent is not given at all.”  Id. at 534, n.31. 
 42. Practically all states do grade sexual offenses.  See, e.g., Robert R. 
Lawrence, Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility 
of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings, 70 Va. 
L. Rev. 1657, 1664 (1984) (observing that most states have adopted graded 
“sexual offense” legislation).  Moreover, it is probably unhelpful to use “rape” as a 
generic name for every sexual offense.  Not every homicide is murder; the same 
way, not every sexual offense is rape.  In fact, some states have abandoned this 
term altogether.  Instead, the offense is called “criminal sexual conduct.”  See, 
e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.520a to .520e, .520i (1996). 
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use force or violence, his offense goes up one notch to 
second degree sexual assault.  The use or threat of use of a 
dangerous weapon brings it up to first degree sexual 
assault.43  This differentiating between more and less 
significant threat, however, has nothing to do with the 
victim’s contribution.44 
Under the principle of conditionality of rights, a victim 
may lose her right not to be harmed either voluntarily or 
involuntarily.  To lose this right voluntarily, the victim must 
consent to a certain act.  Naturally, consent to any 
continuous personal contact is revocable.  By consenting to 
undergo a root canal procedure or to attend a friend’s poetry 
reading, one does not acquire an obligation to go through the 
painful experience until the very end.  Moreover, one does 
not assume the risk that the dentist will continue drilling 
despite the patient’s desperate objections.  It seems obvious 
that the same should be true for sexual intimacy, no matter 
what was the reason for a request to stop it—pain, 
psychological discomfort, or anything else. 
Now, can a person involuntarily lose her right not to be 
raped?  One may forfeit a right to bodily inviolability only if 
that person has infringed upon an important right of 
another.45  In other words, post-penetration rape may be 
fully or partially justified if the perpetrator had a right that 
his sexual partner would continue the intercourse as long 
 
 43. Wis. Stat. § 940.225 (1999). 
 44. The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) reduces rape from a felony of the first 
degree to the felony of the second degree if the victim was a “voluntary social 
companion of the actor upon the occasion of the crime” or had “previously 
permitted him sexual liberties.”  Model Penal Code § 213.1(1) (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962).  I will not add anything new by saying that the Sexual Offenses 
section of the MPC should have been revised a long time ago.  See, e.g., Deborah 
W. Denno, Why the Model Penal Code’s Sexual Offense Provisions Should Be 
Pulled and Replaced, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 207, 209-10 (2003) (criticizing the 
MPC rape rules).  In addition to the cited provision, the gender-specific language 
(§§ 213.1-213.4); the marital rape exception (§§ 213.1-213.6); the offense of 
seduction by promise to marry (§ 213.3(1)(d)); and the defense, available in 
certain instances, of the victim’s sexual promiscuity (§ 213.6(3)) are, to put it 
mildly, outdated, and embarrassing to see in the influential document like the 
MPC. 
 45. I am not discussing here whether one’s right not to be raped may be 
overridden, e.g., under the balance of evils. 
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as the perpetrator desired.  I do not believe such a right 
exists.  Courts refuse to order specific performance even of 
commercial contracts for personal services because to do so 
“would . . . run contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
prohibition against involuntary servitude.”46  To the extent 
values of liberty and personal autonomy are worth 
anything, frustrated sexual expectations may give rise to a 
grudge but not to a legal (or moral) right to proceed with 
the unwanted intimacy. 
Even if the victim violated a legitimate right of the 
perpetrator, should her misconduct partially justify rape?  
Let’s say a woman slaps a man on the face, he loses control, 
and in the state of rage, he rapes her.  I do not think that in 
this case the defendant should be granted mitigation 
either.  Rape is no different from physical torture, which is 
not subject to the defense of provocation and, in my view, 
justly so.47  Considerations of human dignity and autonomy 
dictate that certain rights, including the right not to be 
tortured or raped, may not be forfeitable.48 
Finally, to be justified under the theory of self-defense, 
the rape must be immediately necessary to prevent the 
victim from causing serious harm to the perpetrator.  I 
guess a case of “raping in self-defense” would look like that: 
a woman attacks a man with a knife.  The man is not 
armed.  To prevent the woman from stabbing him, he has 
only one choice: to rape her.  I may be lacking in 
imagination but I have trouble visualizing this scenario. 
 
 46. Government Guarantee Fund v. Hyatt Corp., 95 F.3d 291, 303 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 47. See, e.g., Sensobaugh v. State, 244 S.W. 379, 379 (Tex. App. 1922) 
(denying defense of provocation to defendant who maimed his wife’s lover without 
the intent to kill); see also Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 473, n.342 
(pointing out that rape and torture do not satisfy the excusatory requirement of 
provocation pursuant to which the perpetrator must act impulsively, in an 
immediate response to the offense). 
 48. For discussion of excusatory requirements that prevent rape from being 
covered by the defense of provocation, see Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, 
at 473-74, n.342. 
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III.  RIGHTS: MORAL OR LEGAL? 
In my article, I argue that one way for a victim to lose 
or reduce his right not to be harmed is by violating a legal 
right of the perpetrator.  Husak disagrees that the right in 
question should be legal rather than moral.  He claims that 
“[a]ttempts to use our legal rights to decide when victim 
fault alters the criminal liability of perpetrators are both 
too broad as well as too narrow.”49 
In an attempt to prove that my approach is too broad, 
Husak wonders: “In some Muslim countries, for example, 
women have no legal right to dress provocatively.  Would 
Bergelson conclude that an Afghani woman who broke the 
law by wearing a miniskirt in public provides a partial 
defense for Afghani rapists?”50  A couple of paragraphs 
later, Husak answers his own rhetorical question, 
admitting that perhaps his counterexamples “betray a 
misunderstanding”51 of the principle of conditionality of 
rights, which, as my article indicates, “require[s] the 
offender to have the right that the victim not behave as she 
does,”52 and does not simply mitigate the offender’s liability 
due to any illegal act by the victim. 
But if the right that the victim not behave the way she 
did is personal, how can we explain the defense of others?  
Under the common law, the right applied only to the 
defense of family members and close associates.53  The 
restriction was a result of the right’s origin: it evolved from 
the right to protect one’s property, particularly one’s 
household (including one’s wife, children, servants, etc.). 54  
Today, the rationale is somewhat different—the right to 
defend others is viewed as a derivative right, an extension 
 
 49. Husak, supra note 13, at 535. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 536. 
 52. Id. 
 53. 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 170 (2004). 
 54. See Rollin Morris Perkins, Criminal Law, 1018-19 (2d ed. 1969); 4 William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 3 (Univ. of Chicago Press 
1979) (1769). 
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of the attacked person’s self-defense,55 a form of 
subrogation of rights: “One asserting the justification of 
defense of another steps into the position of the person 
defended.  Defense of another takes its form and content 
from defense of self.”56  Clearly, this subrogation is possible 
only when the person whose rights are at risk is 
identifiable.  Various victimless crimes, including the 
hypothetical offense of wearing a miniskirt, do not allow 
any private citizen to assert a personal right that has been 
violated and the protection of which might be delegated to 
or assumed by another. 
Whereas Husak fails to demonstrate the 
overinclusiveness of the principle of conditionality of rights, 
his argument that the principle may be underinclusive has 
merit.  We can think of a number of examples, particularly 
in the area of provocation, in which the victim acts 
immorally but legally with respect to the perpetrator (e.g., 
taunts or insults him), and we intuitively feel that, if, in 
these circumstances, the perpetrator overreacts and 
assaults the victim, his liability should be reduced.57  I 
share this intuition, yet I would reduce the perpetrator’s 
liability through partial excuse and retain full or partial 
justification only for the violation of legal rights.58 
My choice is mandated by practical as well as 
theoretical considerations.  Let’s say we chose the violation 
of the perpetrator’s moral (instead of legal) rights as the 
ground for reducing his liability—how would we decide 
what moral rights people possess?  Searching, as Husak 
invites me to do, for a “broad and deep”59 societal consensus 
as to whether particular lawful behavior is nevertheless 
 
 55. See, e.g., Ducket v. State, 966 P.2d 941, 944-45 (Wyo. 1998). 
 56. Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d. 379, 383 (Wyo. 1979). 
 57. Simons and Harel make similar arguments.  See Harel, supra note 8, at 
501-02 (arguing that the provoking act need not be a violation of duty on the part 
of the victim); see also Simons, supra note 3, at 562 (“It would be plausible, on a 
partial justification rationale, to mitigate in the case of a victim who subjected the 
defendant to intense and protracted emotional abuse, even if that abuse is not 
otherwise criminal or tortious.”). 
 58. See, Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 476. 
 59. Husak, supra note 13, at 537. 
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immoral does not strike me as a good practical solution.  
How shall we do the searching—by polls?  Shall we make 
participation in these polls mandatory, under the penalty 
of law, in order to ensure that the consensus is in fact 
“broad and deep”?  How often shall we conduct these polls?  
And would not the very questions asked reveal inevitable 
social and cultural biases?  In other words, how can we 
legitimately define the scope of overwhelmingly recognized 
moral and immoral conduct?60 
An alternative solution suggested by Husak is to reject 
the conventional morality in favor of critical morality.61  
This seems to be an appealing option, until we start 
thinking of its practical implementation.  I wonder how we 
would go about incorporating these moral rights into a 
legal definition of the new defense?  How would we (a) 
determine, and (b) notify the community of what this “true” 
morality entails, i.e., what behavior is justifiable?  Husak, 
for instance, seems to believe that, by agreeing to sexual 
penetration, a woman diminishes her right not to be forced 
to have sexual intercourse against her will.62  I believe 
otherwise.  Critical morality, by definition, has the “correct” 
answer but neither Husak nor I nor the rest of the 
community can claim the privilege of its superior 
knowledge. 
 
 60. Judge Hand has raised similar concerns in his famous immigration 
decisions when he pointed out the difficulty of determining what constitutes a 
“good moral character” or “the generally accepted moral conventions current at 
the time.”  Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450, 451 (2d Cir. 1949).  He found 
the task imposed on courts “impossible of assured execution; people differ as 
much about moral conduct as they do about beauty.”  Johnson v. United States, 
186 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1951).  He criticized the notion that the court could rely 
on the “judgment of some ethical elite, even if any criterion were available to 
select them.”  Id.  Judge Hand also considered and rejected the possibility of poll 
data.  “Even though we could take a poll, it would not be enough merely to count 
heads, without any appraisal of the voters.”  Schmidt, 177 F.2d at 451. 
 61. See H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 20 (1963) (differentiating 
positive morality, “the morality actually accepted and shared by a given social 
group,” from critical morality, “the general moral principles used in the criticism 
of actual social institutions including positive morality”). 
 62. Husak, supra note 13, at 533-34 (suggesting that post-penetration 
revocation of consent is the kind of victim behavior that should reduce the 
perpetrator’s liability). 
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As a result, had we followed Husak’s suggestion, 
judges and jurors would have no better guidance than their 
own understanding of critical morality—i.e., in the end the 
conventional (or even personal, idiosyncratic), and not 
critical, morality would determine the perpetrator’s 
culpability.  Considering the variety of opinions on many 
moral issues in any society, and particularly in a 
multicultural society like ours, that would lead to 
inconsistent, unpredictable, and unfair verdicts. 
Due to these concerns, my proposal is intentionally 
curtailed.  I advocate an affirmative defense that would 
completely or partially justify the perpetrator if, among 
other things, the victim has violated the perpetrator’s legal 
rights.  These rights should be legal and not merely moral 
because the scope of protected rights must be clearly and 
legitimately defined and communicated to the community.63  
This is required by the very principle of legality considered 
to be the first principle of American criminal law 
jurisprudence.64 
In addition, using moral instead of legal rights to 
determine legal liability is a dangerous step back to the 
overwhelmingly criticized and rejected doctrine of “moral 
wrong.”  Pursuant to that doctrine, a person would lose a 
right to invoke a defense (mistake of fact) if he acted 
immorally, although not illegally, and his act produced a 
criminal result.65  Similarly to the “moral wrong” doctrine, 
Husak’s proposal may cause the victim to lose a legal right 
 
 63. See, e.g., People v. Phyfe, 32 N.E. 978 (N.Y. 1893) (holding that a “citizen 
is entitled to an unequivocal warning before conduct on his part . . . can be made 
the occasion of a deprivation of his liberty or property”); People v. Arroyo, 777 
N.Y.S. 2d 836, 844 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004) (applying the same rule). 
 64. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 39 (3d ed. 2001). 
 65. Id. at 157.  The classic case in which the doctrine was applied is Regina v. 
Prince, 2 L.R.-C.C.R. 154 (1875), in which the defendant was prosecuted for 
“unlawfully tak[ing] or caus[ing] to be taken, any unmarried girl, being under the 
age of sixteen years, out of the possession . . . of her father . . . .”  The defendant 
believed the girl to be eighteen, whereas in fact she was only fourteen.  The court 
convicted the defendant, denying him the defense of a mistake of fact because, 
even if the circumstances had been as he believed them to be, his act would have 
been immoral. 
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(e.g., not to be assaulted) simply because she did something 
immoral (e.g., broke a promise). 
Therefore, in my view, it is preferable to be somewhat 
underinclusive and limit the application of the principle of 
conditionality of rights to legal rights only.  This seems to 
be a reasonable solution from both the theoretical and 
practical perspectives.  It still allows a court to apply the 
defense of excuse to limit the perpetrator’s liability if it 
finds that the victim’s immoral but legal behavior would 
make a reasonable person lose his temper.  And, as a policy 
matter, it promotes respect for the law by maintaining that 
a person whose behavior was absolutely legal, even if mean 
and malicious, may not be justifiably assaulted. 
IV.  ASSUMPTION OF RISK: UNREASONABLE BUT LEGAL AND 
MORAL BEHAVIOR OF THE VICTIM 
In conclusion, Husak poses what he considers to be the 
hardest question about comparative liability: should it 
apply to situations in which the victim acted unreasonably, 
although perfectly legally and morally?66  In Husak’s 
example, some of his colleagues irresponsibly fail to install 
software that would protect their computers from viruses.  
He asks: “To what extent should perpetrators who 
deliberately create a computer virus be less culpable for all 
of the harms that occur—even those harms that would 
have been prevented if victims had taken reasonable 
precautions?”67 
In my mind, the perpetrator’s liability should not be 
affected by merely stupid or irresponsible acts of the victim.  
A car thief’s liability should not be reduced simply because 
the car owner has left his car unlocked; and a rapist’s 
liability should not be reduced because a jogger has chosen 
a deserted section of the Central Park for her evening 
exercise.68 
 
 66. Husak, supra note 13, at 538. 
 67. Id. at 539. 
 68. My views are shared by some and opposed by some of my commentators.  
Cf. Hurd, supra note 4, at 510 (arguing that “the law would be unwise to 
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One does not owe criminals a duty to protect oneself or 
one’s property from their intentional criminal acts.69  That 
is not to say that the victim owes no duty to anyone.  For 
example, in torts, as Simons correctly notes, a car owner 
who has left the car key in the ignition is not at fault with 
respect to the car thief but may be at fault with respect to a 
third party who was run over by the car thief.70  Similarly, 
an irresponsible faculty member may be at fault with 
respect to his colleagues whose computers were infected 
because of his lack of due care.  He may be reprimanded or 
even fined but that will have no effect on the hacker’s 
liability because the careless faculty member owed no duty 
of care to him. 
 
articulate an assumption of risk defense that reduced the criminal penalty for 
wrongdoing every time a victim knowingly and voluntarily encountered its 
prospect”). 
For we should then find that a woman who wore a low-cut red dress to a 
rough bar reduced her rights against rape if she knew that in dressing 
provocatively she might incite the unwanted attentions of a drunken 
aggressor.  And we should find that the jogger who entered Central Park at 
dusk knowing of the risk of being mugged was complicit in his own 
mugging; his voluntary assumption of a known risk properly reduces the 
penalty imposed on the predictable assailant.  And we should find that the 
woman who ran to the store for a jug of orange juice on New Year’s Eve 
voluntarily reduced her rights against being struck by a drunk driver, for 
she knowingly and voluntarily invited those risks when she ventured onto 
the roads on that treacherous night.  And we should find that a person who 
knowingly left her keys in her car invited its theft, thus reducing the 
penalty justifiably imposed on the car thief. 
Id.  But see Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a 
Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1181 (1994) 
(arguing that criminal law should punish perpetrators who commit crimes 
against careless victims less severely).  For my critique of Harel’s position, see 
Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 424-25, 467. 
 69. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Domination in Wrongdoing, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 
347, 356 (1996). 
The criminal law shields victims against their own imprudence. They are 
entitled to move in the world at large with as much freedom as they enjoy 
behind locked doors. They can walk in the park when they want, sit where 
they want in the subway, and wear skimpy clothes without fearing that 
they will be faulted for precipitating rape. 
Id.  See also, Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 473-74. 
 70. Simons, supra note 3, at 556. 
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V.  CONSENT V. ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
I must admit, I find completely fascinating the way 
Hurd builds her case for distinguishing between consent 
and assumption of risk.  Moreover, I have nothing against 
“splitting the doctrinal baby”;71 however, I’d prefer the cut 
to be across a different joint. 
Hurd starts with critically looking at my analysis of 
the defense of consent in torts.72  Following the 
Restatement, I maintain that, to be effective, consent must 
be given for the particular conduct, or to substantially the 
same conduct.73  What Hurd does not like in this language 
is the word “conduct,” which presumably applies to both 
actual consent and assumption of risk.  She draws a line 
between one’s consent to another’s (i) physical contact with 
his person or property, and (ii) wrongful conduct, assuming 
one appreciates its risks and wrongfulness.  In the first 
case, consent is “morally magical: it eliminates wrongdoing 
altogether.”  In the second case, consent makes the victim 
partially responsible for the resulting harm or loss. 
I am not sure this distinction is helpful.  It is not clear 
to me, for instance, why we should put consent to physical 
contact into a separate category.  What if X consents to 
someone watching her take a shower, or taking nude 
pictures of her, or posting those pictures on the Internet?  
There is no physical contact involved in any of these 
situations.  However, X’s consent seems to be equally 
“morally magical” in that it completely eliminates 
wrongdoing. 
Moreover, if Hurd’s goal is to “accurately parse 
between those who drag race and those who leave their 
keys in vehicles stolen by drag racers,”74 she does not need 
this distinction.  Hurd correctly underscores that to lose a 
 
 71. Hurd, supra note 4, at 513. 
 72. Id. at 511-12. 
 73. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892A(2)(b) (1979) (“To be effective, 
consent must be to the particular conduct, or to substantially the same conduct.”); 
cmt. to 892A(2) (same). 
 74. Hurd, supra note 4, at 512. 
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right voluntarily, the victim has to “consent to the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct, and not just to the risk that 
that conduct will occur.”75  A person assumes the risk that 
this particular conduct may cause him harm; however, he 
does not assume the risk of different conduct.  Accordingly, 
a woman who consents to a kiss runs a risk that she may 
contract her partner’s herpes; yet she does not assume the 
risk of being raped. 
In my view, a more important distinction between 
consent and its constructive form, assumption of risk, is that 
a person may, expressly or tacitly, consent to the unlawful 
conduct of another; in that case he becomes a coauthor of his 
injury.  These are, for instance, cases of drag racing and 
Russian roulette.  However, a person may not be deemed to 
have assumed the risk of the unlawful conduct of another.  
That is so because people who violate the law have no right 
to force others to accommodate their criminal behavior by 
acting in a certain way or refraining from action.  A different 
rule would reward unlawful behavior at the cost of lawful 
behavior, which would be both unfair and inefficient.  The 
law may not force people to sacrifice their liberty so that 
wrongdoers do not get “greater opportunities for 
wrongdoing.”76  Therefore, the woman who ran to the store 
for a jug of orange juice on New Year’s Eve did not assume 
the risk of being struck by a drunk driver, just as the 
hapless colleague of Husak did not assume the risk of 
having his computer attacked by a hacker. 
VI.  CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
What if the victim herself acted unreasonably or 
unlawfully—can we say that the perpetrator’s liability 
should be reduced because of her contributory negligence, 
i.e., her failure “to accord herself due care?”77  As I have 
already discussed in connection with Hurd’s and Husak’s 
assumption of risk arguments, for unreasonable but lawful 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 521. 
 77. Id., at 516-17. 
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behavior, the answer should be “no.”78  What about the 
unlawful conduct of the victim, which contributed to his 
injury?  Should the fault of “a victim who failed to strap her 
seatbelt, or who herself drove drunk, or who neglected to 
service the brakes of her vehicle”79 reduce the criminal 
liability of the perpetrator?  This issue is far too complicated 
for the shorthand of this article, but I think that the answer 
should be “yes,” to the extent the unlawful conduct of the 
victim contributed to the harm that befell her. 
I see a principled difference between the victim’s 
careless but lawful behavior and her unlawful conduct in 
the scope of the legitimate expectations of the perpetrator.  
Numerous considerations, from liberty to legality, prohibit 
punishing people for thoughtless but lawful behavior that 
harmed no one but themselves.  To the extent they do not 
harm others, people have the right to be stupid, clumsy, 
and irresponsible.  So, when we make our plans and go 
through our lives, we cannot rely on other people being 
highly intelligent, alert, and prudent.  Accordingly, if our 
culpable actions cause others harm, we have no basis to 
claim the reduction of liability based on their imperfect 
behavior. 
On the other hand, we have the right to expect that 
other people obey the law (at least when their failure to do 
so would directly affect us).  If traffic rules require drivers 
to stop at the red light, I should be able to rely on that rule.  
Thus, if the victim did not stop, and our accident was 
caused by both his failure to stop and my speeding, it 
seems fair to reduce my liability.  Moreover, even if I was 
fully responsible for the accident, but due to the victim’s 
unlawful failure to wear a seat belt, his injury turned out 
to be more significant than it would be otherwise, it also 
seems fair to reduce my liability for the harm, which is 
attributable to the victim’s own fault. 
 
 78. See supra, notes 65-69 and the accompanying text. 
 79. Hurd, supra note 4, at 517. 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art32
BERGELSONREPLYMACRO.DOC 4/20/2005  11:43 AM 
2005] REPLY 591 
VII.  ATTEMPT, ENDANGERMENT, AND OTHER RISK 
CREATION 
How would the principle of conditionality of rights 
work in cases of attempts, endangerment, and other 
instances of risk creation in which the actor does not 
actually bring about the relevant social harm?80  Simons 
asks: “If a speeding driver almost strikes the victim, but 
misses, should it really matter whether the victim was 
jaywalking?”81  Well, if we are willing to prosecute a driver 
who almost struck a pedestrian, I don’t quite see why we 
should deny the driver a defense.  If the victim’s right to 
physical inviolability was recklessly endangered, and we 
view this endangerment as wrongdoing serious enough to 
justify criminal punishment,82 it certainly matters to what 
extent it was the defendant’s fault.  Would Simons refuse to 
consider the victim’s conduct even if the victim 
intentionally threw himself in front of the car in an 
unsuccessful attempt to commit suicide? 
There is nothing idiosyncratic in my answer.  We know 
numerous examples of attempted crimes when the conduct 
of the victim made all the difference for the liability of the 
perpetrator.  A defendant charged with an attempted 
murder for shooting at the victim may be fully exonerated 
if he acted in self-defense or may be found guilty of a lesser 
offense if the victim provoked him.83 
 
 80. Simons, supra note 3, at 563-64. 
 81. Id. at 564. 
 82. See Model Penal Code § 211.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see also 
Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 963, 987-90 (2003) 
(arguing that imposition of risk is a harm to the person on whom it is inflicted).  
But see Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 249 (1996); 
Heidi M. Hurd, Nonreciprocal Risk Imposition, Unjust Enrichment, and the 
Foundations of Tort Law: A Critical Celebration of George Fletcher’s Theory of 
Tort Law, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 711 (2003); Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World 
Is Wrong?, 5 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 157, 193-208 (1994).  Hurd contests the 
claim that “risks to others are, by themselves, wrongs, and that individuals can 
have rights against risks (rather than simply rights against harms).”  Hurd, 
supra note 4, at 519 n.21. 
 83. See, e.g., Cox v. State, 534 A.2d 1333, 1336 (Md. 1988) (an attempt to kill 
a provoker is punishable as an attempted voluntary manslaughter); State v. 
Robinson, 643 A.2d 591, 597 (N.J. 1994) (same). 
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It appears that the crucial question for the 
determination of the perpetrator’s liability in inchoate 
crimes is whether there is an identifiable victim.  If such a 
victim exists, his conduct has to be taken into account the 
same way as in completed crimes.  If, on the other hand, 
the perpetrator is guilty of risk creation with respect to the 
general public (e.g., an attempted terrorist act), there is no 
particular victim(s) whose conduct may be relevant; 
accordingly, the principle of conditionality of rights would 
not warrant a defense.  Now, what if the perpetrator 
strikes against an aggressor or provoker but at the same 
time recklessly endangers the lives of a group of innocent 
bystanders (e.g., by throwing a hand grenade that 
fortuitously failed to explode into a room full of people)?  I 
think it would make sense to conclude that the victim’s 
aggressive or provocative conduct should be taken into 
account to eliminate or reduce the perpetrator’s liability as 
to that one person but not the rest of the group. 
Generally speaking, the principle of conditionality of 
rights should be applied to inchoate offenses the same way 
it can be applied to completed offenses—if there is an 
identifiable victim, the conduct of that victim may affect 
the perpetrator’s liability. 
VIII.  MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS 
Another of Simons’s concerns involves multiple 
defendants: “If a single defendant’s liability is properly 
mitigated because of the victim’s fault, should it not also be 
mitigated if a second defendant’s faulty or wrongful 
conduct contributed to a victim’s harm (apart from whether 
the victim’s own conduct is properly considered a 
mitigation)?”84 
Simons correctly deduces that no mitigation would be 
available to two defendants engaged in criminal conduct 
together, as conspirators or accomplices.85  He does not 
 
 84. Simons, supra note 3, at 564. 
 85. Id. (observing that, when two defendants act together, additional 
culpability and danger of group criminality might preempt any possible 
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discuss a case in which the harm is divisible, e.g., in which 
two unrelated, independently acting defendants are 
responsible for different harms.  Say, as a result of 
attending a restaurant, the victim suffers a theft and a 
severe food poisoning.  I don’t think Simons would have a 
problem with holding each, the thief and the reckless cook, 
responsible only for the harm he personally caused.86 
The scenario Simons seems to have in mind is known 
in the legal literature as concurrent overdetermination.87  A 
typical example would be a case of two independent 
concurrent fires, each sufficient to burn down the building, 
which join and together destroy it.88  Simons asks: “[i]f two 
independent speeding drivers collide and cause the victim’s 
death, in circumstances where the speeding of either alone 
would have been sufficient to cause the harm, should the 
punishment for each be mitigated, because of the causal 
contribution and fault of the other?”89 
Simons apparently thinks that the principle of 
conditionality of rights would mandate such mitigation.  
This is an odd proposition and certainly one that does not 
follow from my argument.  Concurrent overdetermination 
cases involve parties whose individual actions are 
independent from anyone else’s actions (in terms of either 
causation or culpability) and do not change the ultimate 
amount of harm.  Therefore, in those cases, consistently 
with the principle of conditionality of rights and current 
law, the conduct of any additional actor—a perpetrator or 
the victim—does not have any effect on the liability of a 
particular defendant. 
For example, in Simons’s hypothetical, neither driver 
would be entitled to any reduction of liability.  Each 
driver’s negligence is a “but for” and proximate cause of the 
 
mitigation). 
 86. I assume the two crimes are truly unrelated, as opposed to, say, food 
poisoning giving the thief an opportunity to steal the victim’s wallet. 
 87. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Causation and Responsibility, Soc. Phil. & 
Pol’y, Summer 1999, at 1, 9-13; Richard Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1735 (1985). 
 88. See Moore, supra note 87, at 10. 
 89. Simons, supra note 3, at 564. 
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fatal accident.90  Each collision is causally sufficient and 
independent from the other—if the other driver did not 
exist, the victim would still be dead.  Conversely, outside of 
the overdetermination context, when a collision results 
from negligent actions of a driver and the victim, the causal 
contribution of each party is a necessary condition of the 
resulting harm.  If the victim acted differently, he would 
not be harmed. 
More importantly, in Simons’s hypothetical, the 
wrongful actions of one defendant toward the victim do not 
reduce the obligations of the other defendant not to act 
wrongfully toward the same victim.  Accordingly, each of 
them is guilty of violating the victim’s rights.  In contrast, 
the principle of conditionality of rights allows mitigating 
the perpetrator’s liability only when the victim has acted in 
such a way as to eliminate or reduce some of his rights, 
thus eliminating or reducing the perpetrator’s 
responsibility for interfering with them. 
Therefore, in accord with the principle of conditionality 
of rights, the number of independent, simultaneously 
acting defendants in cases of concurrent overdetermination 
is completely irrelevant to the issue of their respective 
criminal liability. 
IX.  PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
The final question I want to address is how the defense 
of comparative criminal liability should be implemented.  
According to my proposal, the comparative liability should 
function as an affirmative defense. 
In some circumstances, the victim’s conduct would provide a 
complete justification, whereas in other circumstances it 
would only mitigate the defendant’s liability.  In any event, 
 
 90. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 87, at 29-30.  See also Corey v. Havener, 65 
N.E. 69 (Mass. 1902) (holding both defendants liable in a case where each rode 
his motorcycle by the victim’s horse, and the frightened horse injured the victim, 
although the noise of even one motorcycle would have been sufficient to produce 
the same result). 
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the defendant would bear the burden of production.  As for 
the burden of persuasion, it may be more appropriate to 
follow the MPC approach and allocate it to the prosecution, 
unless specified otherwise.91 
In this regard, two commentators, Husak and Simons, 
express concerns.  Husak tries to envision how the 
mechanism of mitigation will work in the case of partial 
reduction of criminal liability.  He correctly notes that the 
structure of homicide offenses provides an ideal solution.  
“When persons commit homicides, fault mitigators such as 
provocation function as ‘imperfect defenses,’ allowing 
defendants to be convicted of a lesser-included offense like 
manslaughter.”92  He then goes on to warn that “lesser-
included offenses are rare outside the context of homicide; 
there usually is no hierarchy of offenses for which 
defendants whose fault is mitigated might be convicted.”93 
I agree with Husak that the structure of homicide 
offenses provides a convenient paradigm for applying any 
partial defense, not just the one related to the victim’s 
conduct.  However, I disagree that, to incorporate a partial 
defense, there is no other “alternative but for legislatures 
to enact a number of lesser-included offenses for which 
defendants whose liability is mitigated can be convicted.”94 
One way to proceed, in the case of successful 
invocation of the defense of comparative liability, is to 
permit downgrading of an offense charged to a lower degree 
or to another lesser related offense, regardless of whether 
or not it is also lesser included.95  This solution would not 
require too much legislative effort since the majority of 
non-victimless crimes (and we need to deal only with those) 
already have some less serious analogues, particularly in 
the jurisdictions whose penal codes are modeled on the 
 
 91. Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, at 487. 
 92. Husak, supra note 13, at 525. 
 93. Id. at 525-26. 
 94. Id. at 532. 
 95. An offense is considered lesser included only if “the elements of the lesser 
offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense.”  Schmuck v. United 
States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 (1989). 
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MPC.  For example, article 211 of the MPC includes 
aggravated assault (a felony of the second or third degree), 
simple assault (a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor), and 
reckless endangerment (a misdemeanor).  When warranted 
by facts, say, homicide could be reduced to aggravated 
assault or even reckless endangerment.96 
True, recent decisions have purported to limit jury 
instruction on lesser offenses to those which meet the strict 
requirements for lesser-included offenses.97  Yet, as one 
commentator has suggested, cases that limit lesser offense 
instructions to included offenses typically rely on statutes 
or rules.98  These cases have not considered that sometimes 
a lesser offense can be a defense or defense theory.  Thus, a 
restriction of instruction on a lesser offense may be a 
restriction of the defendant’s constitutional right to present 
a defense.  For that reason, one could argue that when an 
instruction on a lesser non-included offense is necessitated 
by a defense, including the defense of comparative liability, 
it should be allowed. 
I do not insist that this is the best strategy to 
incorporating the defense of comparative liability.  All I 
mean to say is that if we believe that victims’ conduct is 
and ought to be relevant to the criminal liability of 
perpetrators (and Husak certainly seems to think so), we 
have to find a way to make it a part of criminal law. 
While Husak is concerned about expanding the law, 
Simons worries about asking jurors to apply a multifactor 
test, a comparative fault-like inquiry on a case-by-case 
basis, thereby giving them too much discretion over the 
 
 96. See Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 1, notes 329-36, and the 
accompanying text. 
 97. Thomas Lundy, Jury Instruction Corner: Obtaining Instruction on Non-
Included Lesser Offenses, 24 Champion 48, 48 (2000).  See also, Carter v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000); Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998) (holding that 
defendants’ right to a lesser charge jury instruction is limited to lesser-included 
offenses only). 
 98. See Lundy, supra note 97, at 48.  See also Brown v. Commonwealth, 555 
S.W. 2d 252, 257 (Ky. 1977) (“Evidence suggesting that a defendant was guilty of 
a lesser offense is, in fact and in principle, a defense against the higher charge 
. . . .”). 
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length of criminal punishments.99  I do not think Simons’s 
worries are warranted.  In practically any criminal trial, 
jurors have to deal with a multifactor test.  They have to 
decide who had rights to what, who was at fault, and who 
was causally responsible for the harm.  They often have to 
use a “comparative fault-type inquiry” in order to 
determine whether the defendant acted reasonably. 
Moreover, in many instances, that inquiry directly 
translates into the verdict and the length of criminal 
punishments.  For example, in a case of involuntary 
homicide, the difference between negligence, recklessness, 
and recklessness manifesting extreme indifference to the 
value of human life determines the choice between 
negligent homicide (a felony of the third degree), 
manslaughter (a felony of the second degree), and murder 
(a felony of the first degree).100 
In “Victims and Perpetrators,” I was primarily 
interested in making a case for the defense of comparative 
liability in criminal law and identifying general principles 
supporting this defense.  If this defense is recognized, it 
certainly will be necessary to define its boundaries more 
rigorously, coordinate its use with that of other defenses, 
and overcome numerous practical obstacles.  But, as I said, 
if we believe that considerations of fairness, consistency, 
and efficiency mandate the recognition of comparative 
criminal liability, we may not reject the advocated defense 
simply because it will take an effort to implement it. 
 
 99. See Simons, supra note 3, at 565 (“[Bergelson] articulates a multifactor 
test, a comparative fault-type inquiry that apparently is to be applied by a jury 
case by case, resulting, for example, in a reduction of one or more grades of the 
crime, or in a mitigation of the usual sentence within a grade.”). 
 100. Model Penal Code §§ 210.2 & 210.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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